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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: Progress and Challenges: Ten years after the ISPS Code  
- Lessons from the Korean experience 
 
Degree:                           MSc 
 
This dissertation is a study on the progress and challenges of the ISPS Code which has a 
ten-year history since it entered into force in 2004. The study started from the baseline 
that it was the right time to think about how effective this relatively young IMO 
instrument has been. The study has been done based on the real experiences of Korea in 
respect of the implementation of the ISPS Code. 
 
In Korea, the ISPS Code has contributed to the enhancement of maritime security in 
many aspects; building capacity and infrastructure, raising awareness, successful hosting 
of internationally significant events and reduction of security incidents. However, there 
have been challenges; confusion out of discrepancy between the Korean ISPS Code Act 
and the IMO ISPS Code, narrow focus on ship/port interface, essential lack of IMO 
enforceability and lack of response to incidents. 
 
Based on the progress and challenges of the ISPS Code in Korea, this dissertation 
provides recommendations to improve the security of the international maritime world; 
sophisticated legislation at the national and international level, buildup of IMO 
enforceability and response to incidents and so forth. 
 
KEY WORDS : Maritime Security, ISPS Code, IMO, Security Level, Security Measures, 
Terrorism, National Legislation, Model Legislation, Supply Chain Security, USCG  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Study background 
 
Quite a few people around the globe may think that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 is 
an old story which resulted in tremendous ramifications in many ways in terms of 
national security and anti-terrorism. However, the threat arising out of terrorism is an 
ongoing situation which was clearly evidenced in the Benghazi terrorist attack that killed 
the US ambassador to Libya on September 11, 2012 (Stephen, 2013). In addition, most 
recently, amid growing warnings of terrorism in August 2013, a number of Western 
countries including the US and UK stopped the activities of their embassies throughout 
the Middle East and Northern African countries. In particular, the UK raised its maritime 
Security Level to the highest (Level 3) in response to threats of terrorists in accordance 
with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended 
(SOLAS 1974) chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code (Craig, et al., 2013). In other words, the threat of terrorism posed to security 
around the globe remains unchanged over time since 2001 and it is really an ongoing 
significant issue. 
 
Totally 60 Conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) have been 
adopted and 49 Conventions among them have entered into force as of 31 July (IMO, 
2013f). Usually the adoption and the entry into force of conventions have resulted from 
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disastrous maritime accidents; for example, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating 
thereto, as amended (MARPOL 73/78) was introduced by the Torrey Canyon disaster in 
1967, in which 120,000 ton of oil was spilled. Likewise, the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) and the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 
(FUND) were in the same path following maritime disasters. 
 
In contrast, the ISPS Code, including the SOLAS chapter XI-2, is an exceptional case 
because it was introduced due to a non-maritime tragic incident, the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
Though there have been maritime-oriented security incidents such as the hi-jacking of 
the Achille Lauro in 1985 and the USS Cole explosion in 2000, it is the author’s opinion 
that the decisive driving force of the entry into force of the ISPS Code was the 9/11 
incident, originating from outside the maritime field. The horrific effects of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States shocked 
the world (McNaught, 2005). This tragedy showed explicitly that a ship also can be used 
as a weapon, as a means of transporting weapons or perpetrators, and as a means of 
directing funds to finance terrorist activities (Charalambous, 2003). This unprecedented 
and, moreover, catastrophic incident required drastic changes to the existing paradigm 
and structures. 
 
The ISPS Code is the first maritime security regime to cope with terrorism. It has made a 
significant contribution to the enhancement of maritime security in many ways despite 
some shortcomings, which can be understood given the highly-speedy process from the 
drafting of the Code to its entry into force. This year, 2013, marks the tenth year since 
the ISPS Code took effect in 2004 and it will be highly meaningful and informative to 
look into the effectiveness of the relatively young IMO Convention and find ways to 
maximize the value of the existence of the ISPS Code through enhancement of its  
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implementation.  
 
Since the entry into force of the ISPS Code in 2004, the experiences and lessons Korea 
has acquired in the process of the implementation of the ISPS Code are worth sharing 
for the IMO Member States as well as for Korea itself. In this context, this paper will, 
first, look into the background and development of the maritime security regime, and 
salient features of the ISPS Code. It will then examine the effectiveness of the ISPS 
Code since its implementation in Korea, along with challenges that have appeared. 
Finally, it will suggest recommendations to mitigate these challenges in order to 
continuously promote maritime security.  
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
Before and after the entry into force of the ISPS Code, there have been numerous 
worldwide research activities in respect of its effectiveness, and expected consequences. 
In addition, Contracting Governments ranging from the Middle East to South America 
have submitted reports regarding the implementation of the ISPS Code in the form of 
documents to Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) meeting (IMO, 2009; IMO, 2010a). 
The real lessons experienced by the each Member State are worth considering given the 
short period of time since the ISPS Code has taken effect, in order for other Member 
States to be able to benchmark.  
 
The Republic of Korea, as an active participant in the introduction and implementation 
of the IMO Instruments including the ISPS Code, proactively introduced national 
legislation and domestically implemented the ISPS Code in line with the initiation of the 
Code in June 2004. Even though the Korean government presented a report on the 
implementation of the ISPS Code to the IMO MSC eighty-ninth meeting in May 2011, 
the brief document was not enough to give sufficient information to other Contracting 
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Governments (IMO, 2011b) as it included summarized results and positive aspects 
without challenges and shortcomings evidenced in the process of the implementation of 
the ISPS Code.     
 
This dissertation on the progress and challenges of the ISPS Code from the perspective 
of Korea based on practical experiences and lessons aims to achieve objectives as 
follows: 
 
(a) Describe the background and evolution of the ISPS Code; 
(b) Explain the process of the implementation and development of the ISPS Code in the 
Republic of Korea; 
(c) Analyze the uniqueness and salient features of the Korean ISPS Code Act and 
practices in Korea in terms of effectiveness as well as challenges of the ISPS Code; 
(d) Share information and lessons with the IMO Contracting Governments; and 
(e) Make recommendations to enhance the enforceability and effectiveness of the ISPS 
Code at the national and international levels. 
 
1.3 Scope of the study 
  
This dissertation briefly deals with the background and implementation of the ISPS 
Code at the international level as a jumping-off point, and then looks into the cases and 
practices inside the Republic of Korea and identifies noteworthy points which are worth 
considering for Korea as well as the IMO Member States. 
 
The effectiveness and challenges of the ISPS Code discussed in this paper are drawn 
from the Korean experiences and lessons; however, internationally valuable and 
remarkable references are also mentioned in this dissertation given the fact that Korean 
cases are not enough in some fields, and that internationally-recognized materials are 
5 
 
highly recommended and relevant for the enhancement of the ISPS Code.  
 
1.4 Research methodology 
 
This dissertation makes use of quantitative and qualitative analysis. In terms of 
quantitative methodology, the study reviews the publicized reports of the Contracting 
Governments to the IMO including Korean reports and official materials. In contrast, the 
qualitative analysis is also used to extract the substantial key point from the intact data 
and materials; for example, the effectiveness of the ISPS Code from the reports of the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) on the piracy and armed robbery. 
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Chapter 2 
Maritime Security and the ISPS CODE 
 
2.1 Maritime security and terrorism 
 
Maritime security is not a new issue. It has been a serious concern at the IMO since the 
1980s (Mukherjee, et al., 2004). For the development of this paper, there is a need to 
clarify the difference in meaning between safety and security because the two concepts 
are hard to differentiate, and are, to some extent, confused by the general public and 
even by government officials in some cases. Maritime security can be defined as “those 
measures employed by owners, operators, and administrators of vessels, port facilities, 
offshore installations, and other marine organizations or establishments to protect 
against security incidents, terrorist attacks, seizure, sabotage, piracy, pilferage, 
annoyance, or surprise” while maritime safety is considered as being “those measures to 
prevent or minimize the occurrence of accidents at sea that may be caused by 
substandard ships, unqualified crew, or operator error” (Mejia, et al, 2004).  
 
 
Among these threats, terrorism is the main target that the ISPS Code is primarily focused 
on, which can be defined by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the 
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 
or social objectives. 
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The International legal regime to protect maritime security has been developed and 
adapted over the years to respond to different threats to the safety of maritime navigation. 
The development of the legal regime has gone through three main stages. The objective 
of the first stage was to protect ships and crews from attacks by persons on board 
another ship (Mensah, 2003). At that time, the issue centered on piratical attacks upon 
merchant ships and it soon evolved to include practically-performed acts in coastal water 
jurisdictions, which has been termed armed robbery (Mukherjee, et al., 2004). 
 
Then, as the second stage, the subject of maritime security has been high on the agenda 
of the IMO since the deliberations leading to the adoption of the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Convention (SUA) in 1988, which itself was triggered by the Achille 
Lauro incident in 1985. The Achille Lauro incident, where a group of Palestinians seized 
a cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea and murdered a disabled passenger on board, 
convinced the international community that the traditional law of piracy was not 
adequate to deal with new and emerging forms of violence against shipping. 
Consequently, it was agreed that a new legal regime was needed to address the new 
situation. In response to this incident, the IMO adopted the new treaty, SUA Convention 
in 1988. This Convention imposed an obligation on all States Parties to make offenses 
punishable under their national laws and required that the penalties should be 
appropriate, taking into account the grave nature of the offences. 
 
The tragedy of 11 September 2001, the direct cause of the third stage of maritime 
security, together with a number of security incidents involving vessels such as the Our 
Lady of Mediatrix (2000), USS Cole (2000), Limburg (2002), Superferry 14 (2004) and 
the dramatic rise in acts of maritime violence against merchant ships, particularly in 
southeast Asian waters, brought maritime security to the forefront of concerns in the 
shipping world. In particular, the use of hijacked planes demonstrated clearly that 
additional measures were needed not only to prevent attacks that endanger ships and 
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persons and property on board the ships but also to prevent ships from being used as 
instruments or threats of terrorist activities (Mensah, 2003). Finally, the era of the ISPS 
Code began in 2004 through a relatively short period of preparation. 
 
2.2 Development and implementation of the ISPS Code 
 
In December of 2002, the twenty-second session of the Assembly of the IMO agreed on 
the development of new measures relating to the security of ships and port facilities for 
adoption by a Conference of Contracting Governments to SOLAS and thus, preparation 
for the diplomatic conference was entrusted to the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). 
The diplomatic conference convened by the IMO adopted new provisions in the SOLAS 
(chapter XI-2) and other SOLAS amendments including the requirement for ships to fit 
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), to carry a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR), 
and to standardize ship identification markings (IMO, 2012c). At the beginning, the 
revision of the legal framework had been undertaken in respect of the two relevant 
treaties, i.e., the 1988 SUA Convention and the 1974 International Convention on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS). In the meantime, work has been completed on amendments to 
the 1974 SOLAS Conventions (Mensah, 2003).  
 
The ISPS Code was promulgated in 2003, and came into force 1 July 2004 in a speedy 
manner while there were concerns held in some quarters about the unrealistic timeframe 
(Botelho, 2004) and potential disruptions to international trade. However, the US, 
devastated and shocked by the unthinkable terrorist attacks, pressured the IMO, and an 
international agreement was reached on the introduction of the ISPS Code (Robertson, 
2011). Indeed, the environment was highly political and emotionally charged (Franson, 
2003). 
 
Naturally, the objectives and contents of the ISPS Code are largely equivalent to the US 
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Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) which was enacted in 2002 (Ng, 2009). 
The rationale for the ISPS Code being introduced is a security issue, driven by the 
political impetus and reaching into the sphere of State security (Burmester, 2006). 
 
2.3 Salient features of the ISPS Code 
 
The security regime of the IMO is encompassed in SOLAS Chapter XI-2, in which 
Regulations (1~13) are stipulated and there is a sub-regime, the ISPS Code, which 
consists of two main components. Part A provides the minimum mandatory 
requirements that ships and port facilities must follow while Part B, not mandatory, 
provides more detailed guidelines and recommendations. This Section will look into key 
points of the Code which are relevant and closely related to the ISPS Code’s 
effectiveness and challenges.  
 
The main objectives of the Code are as follows (IMO, 2012c): 
 
(a) To establish an international framework involving cooperation between Contracting 
Governments, government agencies, local administrators, the shipping and port 
industries to detect/assess security threats, take preventive measures against security 
incident; 
(b) To establish the respective roles and responsibilities of all these parties concerned; 
(c) To ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security-related   
information; 
(d) To provide a methodology for security assessments so as to have in place plans and 
procedures to react to changing Security Levels; 
(e) To ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security measures are 
in place. 
 
10 
 
In terms of the scope of application of the ISPS Code, ships engaged on international 
voyages, as stated below, and port facilities serving international ships are subject to the 
ISPS Code. Not all international vessels are subject to the ISPS Code in case of cargo 
ships under 500 gross tonnage and, moreover, small vessels which are able to navigate 
internationally in practice but are classified legally as domestic vessels can cause 
vulnerability to maritime security.  
 
(a) Passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft; 
(b) Cargo ships, including high speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upward; 
(c) Mobile offshore drilling units. 
 
Part A of the ISPS Code, which is mandatory, overall stipulates Responsibilities of 
Contracting Governments (Section 4), Ship Security (Section 6 to 12) and Port Facility 
Security (Section 14, 15 and 16). In particular, each Contracting Government has 
authority to set out the Security Level in accordance with the following criteria 
stipulated in Part A of the Code as follows: 
 
(a) Level 1 : Normal, the level at which the ship or port facility normally operates; 
minimum appropriate protective security measures; 
 
(b) Level 2 : Heightened, the level applying for as long as there is a heighted risk of a 
security incident; additional protective security measures; 
 
(c) Level 3 : Exceptional, when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security 
incident; further specific protective security measures. 
 
Security Level and detailed security measures under each level are essential elements of 
this paper whose main topic is the effectiveness and challenges of the ISPS Code as 
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security level and related measures were verified as the source of effectiveness and 
challenges based on Korean experiences.  
 
Part B which is recommendatory stipulates more detailed regulations in respect of Part A. 
Specifically, Part B stipulates the precise security measures of ship and port facilities 
under Security Levels 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Part B is essentially not mandatory but in 
the case of Korea some parts of Part B became mandatory through the process of 
national legislation, which was the source of a problematic situation amid actually 
raising the Security Level. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISPS CODE IN KOREA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks drastically impacted not only on air transportation and 
shipping but on the world as a whole (Franson, 2003). The disaster took place in the 
heart of the US but the repercussions spread around the world as evidenced by the 
introduction of the ISPS Code in the maritime field. The Republic of Korea was not an 
exception. Actually, Korea was also tremendously affected because Korea, as a 
trade-oriented country, is highly dependent on international trade in which carriage of 
goods by sea accounts for an overwhelming portion. New systems and regulations 
resulting from the 9/11 incident and the ISPS Code led to significant changes in Korea.  
 
3.2 Social and historic uniqueness of security in Korea 
 
When it comes to maritime security, the Republic of Korea has a long history compared 
to other countries, which mostly have focused on security issues following the 
catastrophic terrorist attacks in 2001. The Korean peninsula was divided right after 
Japan surrendered to the US and its allies at the end of World War 2 in 1945 because the  
former Soviet Union and the US respectively took control of half of the Korean 
Peninsula; the US was stationed in South Korea and the Soviet Union was on the 
opposite side, the Northern region of the Peninsula. 
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At first, both superpower countries were in a good relationship but sooner or later there 
started the Cold War, in other words, confrontation between the US and Soviet Union. 
One ramification of the beginning of the Cold war was the Korean War during which 
North Korea, with the support of the Soviet Union, unilaterally and unexpectedly 
invaded South Korea in 1950 and failed to communize the Southern region of the  
Peninsula. 
 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the South Korean government came up with a wide 
range of national defense regimes ranging from civil readiness to a military system. 
Naturally, the top priority of the Korean government was to maintain national security, 
and to detect and deter North Korean provocation. In this context, there have been 
several security regimes in South Korea ranging from military mobilization system in 
case of all-out war to protection of National Critical Infrastructure (NCI) such as airports, 
seaports, dams and government buildings. Strictly speaking, it is also true that the 9/11 
terrorist attacks aroused the sense of security awareness in the Korean people in terms of 
terrorism, but Korea already had an established system to address security threats. 
 
3.3 Existing maritime security regime 
 
The structure of Korean national legislation is established in this hierarchical order; Act, 
Presidential Decree (equivalent to Executive Order in the US), Ministerial Decree and  
Ministerial Order, which is the lowest level of the legal framework.  
 
Table 1 The Structure of Legislations in Korea (Source : Edited by Author) 
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These four types of legislation have different enforceability. An act passed by the 
National Assembly has the highest enforcing power in the private as well as public 
sector with penalty articles, which can impose fines or terms in prison. In contrast, the 
remaining legislations do not have authority to impose fines or terms in prison; in other 
words, sub-Act legislations cannot carry out punitive measures in the private sector. 
However, they can impose administrative measures such as a negligence fine on the  
private sector in case of violation of legislation.  
 
In Korea, there have always been strict security and safety systems to protect 
sovereignty, social stability and peace from a neighboring country that has posed a threat 
to Korea. In respect of the maritime field, there is a preexistent security regime called 
“Presidential Decree on National Security” with articles relevant to the security of port 
facilities and significant vessels. This law designates the National Critical Infrastructure 
(NCI) which includes port facilities and significant vessels vital for the nation in terms 
of economic impact and strategic importance in the event of war (MOLEG, 2008).  
 
This legislation has been applied to the security and physical protection of NCI but it is 
also true that it had significant limitations in terms of effectiveness because it was not 
passed at the National Assembly (Legislature of Korea) which is equivalent to the 
Congress in the US. In the Korean legal system, low-level legislation which has not 
passed the National Assembly, such as the Presidential Decree, cannot stipulate penalty 
articles in case of violation from the civil side even though it has controlling power 
when it comes to the public sector under the influence of the president who is the 
commander in chief in respect of administration. Of course, nuclear power plant-related 
legislation was passed by the National Assembly but this was actually an isolated case 
before the enactment of the Korean ISPS Code Act (formally called ‘Act on the Security 
of International Ships and Port Facilities’) in Korea.  
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For a long time, therefore, there had been demand for a higher level of legislation for the 
security and physical protection of NCI including port facilities and ships which are 
significant for national security. However, these demands ended in a failure out of 
concerns about overregulation amid a social atmosphere aspiring to more and more 
freedom and rights of access and knowledge of NCI in the process of democratization.  
 
3.4 National legislation of the ISPS Code 
 
The Republic of Korea was also devastated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks given the close 
relationship between Korea and the US in almost every way, including security alliance. 
It is a widely-recognized fact that Korea and the US are aligned through a mutual 
defense treaty when it comes to security issues, facing almost the same threats in the 
Asian region. Korea proactively joined the movement to adopt a whole new international 
maritime security regime under the leadership of the IMO and spearheaded by the US. In 
fact, the Korean Government legislated a domestic Ministerial Order in October 2003, 
which is the lowest legal regime, to enforce the ISPS Code which was scheduled to enter 
into force in July 2004 because there was not enough time for the Korean government to 
enact Act-level legislation. An existing Presidential Decree on National Security handled 
a wide range of National Critical Infrastructure (NCI) so new legal regime relevant to 
the ISPS Code was necessary.   
 
Over time, demand for higher level legislation had been continuously raised and finally 
the Korean ISPS Code Act passed the National Assembly in February 2007. This new 
Act was well-stipulated with penalty articles and, overall, reflected the IMO ISPS Code 
to a satisfactory level, notwithstanding some parts to be desired .    
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3.5 Salient features of Korean ISPS Code Act 
 
The Korean ISPS Code Act is a domestic version of the ISPS Code adopted by the IMO, 
but the Korean Act has several unique characteristics, different from the IMO ISPS 
Code, reflecting the Korean social and legal circumstances as follows: 
 
 
Table 2 The ISPS Code legislations in Korea  
(Source :Edited by Author from www.law.go.kr) 
 
(a) Article 5 – National Port Security Program 
 
The Korea Act stipulates the National Port Security Program (NPSP) in line with 
existing Korean Acts. In most cases, Korean Acts set up national plans and national 
committees to deal with national plans and strategy. Newly-legislated Korean ISPS 
Code Act also followed the Korean legal practice. This NPSP must be endorsed by the 
Korean International Ship and Port Facility Security Committee (ISPS Committee) 
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which is regulated in Article 34. The National Port Security Program is aimed at the 
consolidation and harmonization of maritime security measures at the national level and 
establishment of security measures and contingency plans against security incidents to 
the National Critical Infrastructure. 
 
Basically, this plan was set up with the principle that it must be valid and useful for the 
upcoming decade based on the reasonable forecast for the future threats and 
circumstances. The current NPSP was set up by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries 
(MOF) and finally approved by the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Committee (ISPS Committee) in 2008, which is explained below. 
 
The National Port Security Program includes long-term policy, strategy and planning in 
respect of maritime security. The Korean maritime world must follow this program as 
the baseline of security. This program is nationwide and stipulates the Regional Port 
Security Program (RPSP) in accordance with National Port Security Program. 11 
Regional Port Offices drew up the Regional Port Security Program through coordination 
with other agencies concerned on the basis of the National Port Security Program. 
 
(b) Article 6 - Setting and change of Security Level 
 
The setting and change of Security Level must be discussed and decided by the Security 
Committee well-stipulated in Article 34. Security measures in detail under each Security 
Level from 1 to 3, are regulated in the Ministerial Decree on the ISPS Code.  
 
(c) Article 19 – Port State Control 
 
The Korean government can carry out Port State Control inspections on foreign vessels 
entering Korean ports pursuant to this Article. Detention, limitation of movement inside 
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the port facility, requirement for corrective measures and banishment measures can be 
taken against security-substandard foreign vessels based on the results of Port State 
Control. In addition, according to the results of reviewing the ship security information 
transmitted from the vessel to the competent authority, limitation of movement, 
requirements for corrective measures, inspection of the vessel and even refusal of call of 
a port can be enforced. 
 
(d) Article 31 – Acquisition of security personnel, equipment and facilities 
 
The owner of a port facility or an international ship must obtain personnel, equipment 
and facilities necessary to maintain security at his or her own expense. This article is in 
line with other existing security legislation. Given the shortage of national budget, the 
Korean Government has enacted domestic legislation giving obligation to the owners of 
National Critical Infrastructure falling outside the scope of the public sector; to meet 
security requirements at their own expenses.  
 
Indeed, the private sector sometimes complains that security affairs belong to the public 
sector and, therefore, the expenses must be granted and, at least, partially, supported by 
the government. Demand from the private sector looks reasonable on the one side but 
the Korean government has taken a stance that the private sector must also assume a 
financial burden because security is also an essential prerequisite of business prosperity 
in the sense that good business is guaranteed by good security. This standpoint has been 
applied in the process of legislation of the ISPS Code in Korea.   
 
(e) Article 34 – International Ship and Port facility Security Committee 
 
The International Ship and Port Facility Security Committee (ISPS Committee) is 
presided over by the Deputy Minister of Oceans and Fisheries and composed of 
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high-level representatives of governmental agencies concerned; Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ, in charge of immigration), Ministry of National Defense (MND), Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (MOHW, in charge of quarantine), Korean Customs Service (KCS), 
National Intelligence Service (NIS, in charge of intelligence collecting and sharing), 
Korean Police Agency (KPA) and Korea Coast Guard (KCG).   
 
 
Figure 1 Korean International Ship and Port Facility Committee 
(Source : Edited by Author from the Korean ISPS Code Act Article 34) 
 
The responsibility of the ISPS Committee is established under the National Port Security 
Program and includes setting and changing national maritime Security Level and 
decision making on maritime security policy and systems. Even though the ISPS mission 
belongs to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, this Committee was 
created in order to maximize the effectiveness of national security policy because 
inter-agency cooperation and close coordination is required.   
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(e) Article 42 – Port facility security fees 
 
This Article is closely related to Article 31. Given the financial burden arising out of 
security requirements ranging from hiring security personnel to acquisition of security 
equipment, the Korean government came up with a policy regarding security fees. The 
owner of a port facility may garner security fees from port users ranging from 
international passengers to shipping companies to cover expenses in accordance with 
Article 31; it is not compulsory and the final decision to garner fees is up to the owners 
of the port facilities. However, this Article is not popular in the field because 
newly-created security fees can undermine the competitiveness of port facilities and it 
has made private port facilities reluctant to collect security fees. In total, seven private 
port facilities started to garner security fees in accordance with Article 42 since 2011.   
 
(f) Articles 47 through 52 – penalties  
 
In cases of violation of the Act, strict law enforcement became legally possible by means 
of fine or imprisonment, which is hugely different in comparison with the existing 
‘Presidential Decree on National Security’, which have not legal authority to impose  
penalties to the private sector. In the realm of Korean legislation, the existence of 
penalty articles is significantly important in enhancing the enforceability of the 
legislation. 
 
3.6 Implementation of the ISPS Code in Korea 
 
As mentioned in section 3.4 (National legislation of the ISPS Code), the legal 
framework of the ISPS Code in Korea has been evolved from lowest-level Ministerial 
Order in 2003 to the highest-level Act which passed the National Assembly in 2007. At 
the beginning of the ISPS Code regime, the legal basis was not fully robust but there was 
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not much confusion or opposition from the private sector.  
 
In preparation for the entry into force of the ISPS Code, the Ministry of Oceans and 
Fisheries (MOF) formed a professional group to reflect SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the 
ISPS Code in domestic law in order to develop and provide a model for a ship security 
plan (SSP) and a port facility security plan (PFSP). The government also fully supported 
the industry by appointing security training organizations and recognized security 
organization (RSO). These efforts were so successful that, as of July 1 2004, the 
Republic of Korea had established SOLAS and ISPS Code-compliant security systems 
for 425 Korean flagged vessels and 123 port facilities called upon by foreign vessels and 
implemented corresponding security activities (IMO 2011b). 
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CHAPTER 4 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ISPS CODE IN KOREA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
With the rapid implementation of the ISPS Code, there were concerns held in some 
quarters about the unrealistic timeframe and potential disruptions to international trade 
(Botelho, 2004); however, the predicted chaos did not eventuate (Wright, 2005). In 
addition, the IMO reported that ships had reached a 'high degree of compliance' with 
minimal disruption to world trade, and that Contracting Governments had approved 
security plans for 97 percent of declared port facilities (IMO, 2005a). The Code has 
achieved many of the desired goals, particularly when compared to many other similar 
initiatives, which were either abandoned or have yet to be widely implemented in terms 
of creation, implementation and enforcement (Timlen, 2007). This chapter reviews the 
positive results of the ISPS Code implementation in Korea based on real experiences and 
lessons.  
 
4.2 Building capacity and infrastructure in respect of maritime security 
 
The ISPS Code is the first IMO instrument to address maritime security threats and 
requires Contracting Governments to enact domestic legislation to enforce security 
measures based on the SOLAS Chapter XI-2. Even though some countries such as the  
Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran had existing legislations in respect 
of maritime security in the forms of ship and port security measures, most countries did 
not have such legislations to enforce security measures prior to implementing the Code 
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(IMO, 2009; IMO, 2011b). 
  
In the case of the Republic of Korea, it had designated port facilities as National Critical  
Infrastructure (NCI) in accordance with the Presidential Decree on National Security 
even before the Code came into force. The Korean government, however, took 
advantage of the new international convention to step up maritime security during the 
time between 2004 and 2013 as follows (IMO, 2011b): 
 
(a) Act-level legislation endows more legal and administrative enforceability to relevant 
government organizations with articles stipulating offenses and penalties; 
 
 
Table 3 Comparison between Act-level and non-Act legislations 
(Source : Edited by Author) 
 
(b) Established General Information Center on Maritime Safety and Security (GICOMS) 
as a single national contact point to receive all ship security alerts from Korean-flagged 
vessels and to share information concerning security. In fact, the establishment of the 
GICOMS was the outcome of the implementation of the ISPS Code and afterwards it 
turned out to be effective in protecting vessels and seafarers from attacks by pirates in 
dangerous waters. The primary reason to establish the GICOMS was that the IMO made 
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it mandatory to install Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Ship Security Alert 
System (SSAS) onboard ships after the 9/11 incident. At the heart of Korea, the Korean 
government could track the movement of international vessels navigating dangerous 
waters, off the coast of Somalia or at the Western Indian Ocean and share information 
transmitted from the vessel under attack with naval vessels or other merchant fleets; 
 
 
Figure 2 Composition of GICOMS 
(Source : Captured by Author from http://www.yesport.go.kr/eng.2010/infGicoms.htm) 
 
(c) Issued International Ship Security Certificates (ISSC) and approved Ship Security 
Plans (SSP) for approximately 1,191 Korean-flagged vessels to which the ISPS Code 
applies; 
 
(d) Designated 177 port facilities, as of September 2013, within Korean territorial waters 
to apply the ISPS Code. Korea approved Port Facility Security Plans (PFSPs) on the 
basis of Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) in compliance with the ISPS Code, 
and issued Statements of Compliance of a Port Facility to all designated port facilities.  
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(e) The Designated Authority (DA) appointed the Korea Institute of Maritime and 
Fisheries Technology (KIMFT) and the Korean Register of Shipping (KRS) as the 
organizations for ship security training. A total of 6,105 personnel under KIMFT, and 
1,506 personnel under KRS have completed the training course for ship security officers 
since 2003. In addition, a total of 1,009 new personnel have completed the training 
course for PFSOs from KRS and 1,476 personnel have completed refresher course to 
obtain the latest security information; 
 
(f) The DA has carried out exercises recommended in the ISPS Code Part B 13.7 yearly 
since 2005 and posted the names of participants on a website to make it easier for 
shipping companies to access the data for the exercises as evidence for Port State 
Control (PSC) inspections and other ISPS verifications; 
 
(g) In order to have appropriate capability as a flag State to undertake ISPS Code 
verification for Korean-flagged vessels, 80 Port State Control Officers (PSCO) for ship 
inspection and ISPS Code verification were newly employed before 1 July 2004. This 
number has been supplemented with an additional 35 PSCOs since then; 
 
(h) In 2011, Korea established an access control system based on Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) at six major ports as the first step of the enhancement of access 
control as well as the flow of cargo. Since the introduction of the ISPS Code, Korean 
government and agencies concerned have tried to determine how to optimally balance 
between security and facilitation of trade.  
 
When it comes to only security, facilitation of trade and swift flow of goods could be 
under-evaluated topics. However, the Korean government realized the importance of the  
facilitation of trade in that it must be done in tandem with the strengthening of security. 
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In this context, as an example, six major ports installed the advanced access control 
system, RFID, which can detect registered information regarding vehicles and personnel. 
The effectiveness of the advanced access control system has been proved and, therefore, 
the Korean Government has been trying to broaden the installation of the RFID to the 
remaining ports (Park, 2011; IMO, 2011b); 
 
(i) Ship security information has been able to be transmitted inside the framework of the 
Port Management Information System (Port-MIS), which is the electronic system to be 
able to collect, share and process the information with regard to vessels calling or 
departing port facilities. At the moment, the Port-MIS of Korea has numerous functions 
relating to port management as well as security information. Once the personnel in 
charge of Port-MIS in a specific port accept the request of calling or departing port, this 
decision and information about the vessel is automatically disseminated through 
government agencies concerned with immigration, customs clearance, quarantine and so 
on; 
 
 
Figure 3 Concept of Port-MIS 
(Source : Captured by Author from http://www.klnet.co.kr/english/product) 
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(j) At the end of 2011, a meaningful measure was accomplished; sharing of surveillance 
cameras between Port Authority and Customs Service in order to achieve an enhanced 
security system and utilize the national budget in a more efficient and reasonable manner. 
This unprecedented cooperation between government agencies was worth commending 
in that the agencies, in a sense, gave up established and exclusive rights to the equipment 
bought and installed by means of tax-payers money. In particular, Korea Customs 
Service (KCS) has installed the most advanced and high-end surveillance cameras in and 
around the port facilities so as to deter and detect smuggling attempts, so the Port 
Authority can now take advantage of the KCS’s equipment (MOF, 2011). 
 
4.3 Raising the maritime security awareness 
 
The level of awareness of maritime vulnerability to terrorist attack has been increased 
through the implementation of Part A of the ISPS Code, and if nothing else, the 
maritime industry should be better prepared for any future terrorist attack (McNaught, 
2005). The raising of the awareness level is a right step given the IMO standpoint and 
goal “To create the necessary security culture and raise our defenses so high that the 
shipping industry does not become a target for terrorist activities” (IMO, 2004b).  
 
The ISPS Code has raised the security awareness of Korea in two categories. The first 
one is the ISPS Code made Korean people realize that threats to security could come 
from outside Korea such as international terrorists groups, not only from inside Korea. 
Secondly, it removed, to some extent, the sense of honorable treatment from the  
government side when government officials do business with the private sector. 
 
(a) Raising security awareness  
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As mentioned in Chapter 3 and section 3.2 (Social and historic uniqueness of security in 
Korea), Korea primarily focused on the protection of the country and prevention of 
provocation from its neighboring country, North Korea. However, it has not always been 
the case that both South and North Korea were in the relationship of military or 
rhetorically-hostile confrontation. From 1998 through 2007, there was drastic change 
between the two countries; close collaboration in terms of economic cooperation, a 
series of reunions of families who were forced to separate during the Civil War from 
1950 to 1953 and even the first Summit meeting in 2000.  
 
Amid this kind of social atmosphere inside South Korea, the awareness of people to 
security issues declined noticeably and, subsequently, attention to national security and 
possible enemy of the state was regarded as outdated. During those ten years, the overall 
social atmosphere in respect of security and national defense was undermined and rights 
of free speech and right to know of the general public outweighed the importance of 
security and safety issues. 
 
In this atmosphere, the introduction of the ISPS Code enlightened the general public that 
security is vital not only inside the Korean Peninsula but also around the world. Korea is 
basically a trade country which imports raw material and exports manufactured goods by 
sea. In order to address threats from terrorist attacks in the maritime field, a 
newly-created security regime was useful in regaining the security awareness of Korean 
people. As an example, in 2004 there was a warning that a terrorist group might attack 
Korean-flagged vessels or even Korean port facilities in protest against Korean 
collaboration with the US over the Iraqi reconstruction plan (Cho, 2004).  
 
Without cease, maintained security awareness was vital for in addressing real attacks 
and provocation such as detonation of nuclear bombs, launch of long-range missiles and 
artillery attacks on Korean territory from its neighboring country when the 10 year 
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period of relative friendliness ended. Even during those years, there had been numerous 
small and large provocations such as sudden attacks on Korean naval patrol vessels with 
casualties. The importance of an appropriate level of security and seamless preparedness 
cannot be stressed enough. The ISPS Code has made it possible for Korean people, 
including the private sector as well as public sector, to maintain security awareness and 
security measures stipulated in the ISPS Code and Korean legislation.  
 
(b) Strict adherence to identification requirements 
 
As Timlen (2007) pointed out, even various officials who were initially hesitant to 
comply with requests to provide their identification at ships' gangways are familiar with 
the need to do so. Given the officials' speed of response to the new regime and the sense 
of authority, awareness of security has been heightened at all levels, in the private and 
public sector.  
 
Korea, like other Asian countries, has a long culture wherein government officials are 
regarded as privileged social elites to be exempted from complying with legislation in 
some cases such as showing identification when entering a port facility. It was a 
longstanding practice but now it has become common sense for any government official 
to show identification when he or she enters a port facility or board a vessel by virtue of 
the implementation of the ISPS Code, which was an international regime.  
 
In 2004, the USCG visited the Korean ports with a view to checking the level of 
compliance of Korean ports with the ISPS Code as part of the International Port Security 
(IPS) Program. At that time, the Korean government and agencies concerned were so 
worried about the result of the USCG inspection that Korea prepared for the visiting 
inspection in every possible way. Finally, on that day the USCG inspection team arrived 
in Busan port, they were allowed to enter the port without any kind of checking control 
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at the gate. From the Korean perspective, allowing visitors to enter a port facility 
without a security check is a consideration for important and high-level visitors. 
However, this act was pointed out by the inspection team as non-compliant with the 
ISPS Code. This incident became the alarm bell to the whole maritime field in Korea 
and, since then, at the gates of port facilities and ships, it has become normal for visitors 
to show their identification and explain the objectives of their visit.  
 
The ISPS Code and a series of visiting programs from overseas has removed the 
longstanding bad practice of the public sector and as a consequence facilitated the 
soft-landing of the ISPS Code in Korea.   
 
4.4 Achievements of the ISPS Code in Korea 
 
4.4.1 International recognition  
 
(a) IMO Audit Program 
 
Korea accepted the Voluntary IMO Contracting Government Audit Scheme (VIMSAS) 
from the IMO audit team in April 2007 in respect of six significant IMO instruments; 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS), 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified 
by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto and by the Protocol of 1997 (MARPOL), 
International Convention for Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers as amended, including the 1995 and 2010 Manila Amendments (STCW), 
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (LL), International Convention on 
Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969 (Tonnage) and Convention on the International 
Regulations for Prevention Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREG).  
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It was found that Korea had been carrying out the implementation of the IMO 
Mandatory Instruments successfully, without any non-conformities, and with only three   
observations and without any non-conformities; the difficulty to find the status of the 
Korean legislations of the IMO Conventions, the difference in legal interpretation of the 
certification of ship inspector between Korean regulations and IMO Conventions and 
thirdly, the lack of post-measures after inspection on Korean-flagged vessels. The ISPS 
Code is also one element of SOLAS and it can be reasonably inferred that the 
implementation of the Code in Korea was found appropriate by the IMO audit team (Lee, 
2007). 
 
(b) USCG IPS Program 
 
Since 2004, USCG experts have visited Korean international port facilities four times; 
2004 July, 2008 February, 2010 May and 2012 July. The USCG recognized that Korean 
port facilities are well-organized for the implementation of the new maritime security 
regime (Kim, 2004). In return, a Korean delegation has visited US port facilities three 
times on a reciprocal basis in order to look at best practices and create framework for 
information sharing and international cooperation between Korea and the US.  
 
(c) Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Program 
 
Along with the IMO, APEC has been trying to enhance maritime security by means of 
its own program, the ISPS Code Implementation Assistance Program (ICIAP). The aim 
of the ICIAP program is to assist APEC Economies in developing the capacity required 
to effectively implement the ISPS Code through three-phase activities as follow. Phase 1 
is raising awareness of the ISPS Code requirements and assisting developing Economies 
to develop a framework for implementing these requirements. Phase 2 is building 
capacity of developing Economies to conduct the ISPS Code compliance related to drills, 
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exercises and assessment. Lastly, Phase 3 is the Port Security Visit Program (PSVP) to 
identify strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of the ISPS Code and this 
program is voluntary for APEC Economies (APEC, 2010).  
   
In April 2009, the APEC Maritime Security Expert Group visited Busan and Incheon 
ports in response to an invitation by the Korean government, which intended to show 
Korea’s advanced maritime security system. The expert group consisted of the Maritime 
Security Experts of APEC, the Australian government and the Philippine government. 
They acquired information about laws and institutions designed to implement the ISPS 
Code through visits to major ports such Busan and Incheon. During the visit, the 
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries introduced the Korean ISPS Code Act which entered 
into force in 2008, and which embraces the measures of the ISPS Code and the ‘National 
Port Security Program (2008~2017)’, and stressed that Korea was strengthening both the  
institutional and physical security of national ports to achieve higher security levels than 
stipulated in the ISPS Code (MOF, 2009).  
 
4.4.2 Proactive implementation by means of raising security level 
 
Among a number of key articles of the ISPS Code, security level and security measures 
under each security level are significant in terms of the implementation of the Code. 
Korea has relatively abundant experiences in raising its Security Level from 1 to 2 or 3 
in case of a wide range of situations, which are worthy of attention worldwide because 
raising the security level is quite a rare case.  
 
As a matter of a fact, the real cases of raising the Security Level are noticed in the UK 
and India in recent months; however, raising the Security Level was not prevalent and 
hard to find until last year. In August 2013, the UK unprecedentedly raised the Security 
Level of UK-flagged vessels off the coast of Yemen to Level 3 and that of vessels in 
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dangerous waters to Level 2 (Craig, et al., 2013). The Indian government raised the 
Security Level of some ports to Level 2 in June and July 2013 in preparation for possible 
terrorist attacks (OMA, 2013a; OMA, 2013b). The USCG has issued the Port Security 
Advisory (PSA) which is the outcome of the International Port Security Program (IPS 
Program) and indicated that vessels that called or will call specific ports found not in 
compliance with the ISPS Code must elevate their ship Security Level or take additional 
security measures (USCG, 2012a: USCG, 2012b). In particular, it is noteworthy that the 
USCG issued the PSA for Libya in March 2011 due to civil unrest which raised the US 
concern regarding whether port security of Libya was still being executed and 
maintained (USCG, 2011). The threat of terrorism related to Libya was well evidenced 
by the terrorist attack against the US consulate in Benghazi on September 11 2012 
(Stephen, 2013).   
 
Other than cases mentioned in the above paragraph, raising the Security Level under the 
ISPS Code is not common around the world. Therefore, the experiences of Korea in 
raising the Security Level and the subsequent lessons acquired will be valuable and 
meaningful for Contracting Governments to the ISPS Code. 
  
4.4.2.1 Internationally significant events 
  
(a) APEC Summit in November 2005 
 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (AEPC) Summit is hosted annually by one of 
its Member States. In 2005, Korea was a host country for the first time. At that time the 
social atmosphere and situation when it comes to security was not so severe under the 
seemingly non-hostile relationship between the two Koreas. However, there was clear 
concern about possible threats to security from outside the Korean Peninsula such as 
attacks by Al-Qaeda on the US and its allies. In addition, a minor incident could impair 
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the prestige of Korea as a host country so the Korean government needed to be alert for 
any cases.  
 
Despite the argument regarding raising maritime Security Level, the Korean government 
raised its Security Level from 1 to 2 for the first time, pursuant to the Ministerial Order 
in respect of the ISPS Code. At that time, the Korean ISPS Code Act was not yet enacted. 
Given the economic impact on the shipping industry and port-related activities, raising 
of the Security Level was implemented locally following discussion between the  
government agencies concerned; Busan Port and ships in and around the Busan Port (Ji, 
2005). 
 
(b) Group of 20 (G20) Summit in November 2010 
 
Korea is also a Member State of economically advanced countries’ meeting, G20, and 
hosted the G20 Summit in November 2010. Circumstances in Korea when it came to 
security were quite different from those in 2005. In March 2010, a Korean naval vessel 
sank as a result of North Korea’s torpedo attack (BBC, 2010) and tensions between 
South and North Korea were the highest ever since the entry into force of the ISPS Code 
in 2004 (Euronews, 2010). 
 
For the success of the largest international Summit for Korea, the Korean government 
took a strong stance in respect of maintaining security and raised the Security Level 
from 1 to 2 for all international port facilities and vessels calling them, and even raised 
the Security Level of ports adjacent to the venue, Seoul, to Level 3 just before and after 
the Summit in tandem with raising the Security Level of Aviation and Anti-terrorism 
(MOF, 2010). Of course, the raising of the Security Level was to address threats not 
only inside the Korean Peninsula but also those coming from around the world, given 
the importance of international Summit meeting just as the APEC Summit in 2005.  
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(c) Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012 
 
Just two years following the G20 Summit, Korea became the host country of a 
newly-created international summit called the Nuclear Security Summit which was held 
in the US for the first time in 2010. As the second host country of the Nuclear Security 
Summit, Korea was desperate to maintain security during the Summit in Seoul once 
again. This time the number of Summit-level participants was twice that of the G20 
Summit in 2010.  
 
It can be reasonably inferred that government agencies involved were more alert than at 
the G20 Summit given the importance of the event and aggravated relationship inside 
the Korean Peninsula. However, this time, another issue, economic impact, was also 
vital to decision making on the heightening of Security Levels because the leadership of 
Korea tried to avoid negative impact on trade and economic activities arising out of 
reinforced security measures at international ports. 
 
Given the risk assessment and closeness to the venue city, Seoul, ports whose Security 
Level was raised were limited to a minimum. The number of ports whose Security Level 
was elevated was reduced compared to that of the G20 Summit in 2010 in order to 
minimize the economically-adverse impact amid the ceaseless global economic and 
financial crisis. The Korean Government and inter-agency meeting at that time tried to 
fully consider the importance of harmony between maintaining seamless security and 
economic activities in relation to international port facilities and sea-going merchant 
vessels (MOF, 2012).  
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4.4.2.2 Responding to emergencies 
 
(a) Terrorist group’s threats on Korea in 2004 
 
Korea was concerned about regional threats rather than global ones such as attempted or 
actual attacks from international terrorist group, Al-Qaeda. However, in 2004, the 
Korean government decided to dispatch special forces as part of the Iraqi reconstruction 
plan led by the US. Due to this policy, threats from terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, on Korean 
vessels and port facilities were collected and disseminated in July and October 2004.  
 
In response to these threats, the Korean government ordered the shipping industry and 
Busan port authority, the biggest international port, to reinforce security measures to the 
extent equivalent to Security Level 2 (quasi-Level 2) in accordance with the Ministerial 
Order as there was no Act-level legislation in respect of the ISPS Code in 2004 (Cho, 
2004).  
 
Quasi-Level 2 means that security measures under Security Level 2 must be done with 
the exception of security measures related to facilitation of trade and logistics; for 
example, access to ports or vessels and handling of cargo remains unchanged in the 
middle of reinforcing security through frequented patrol, inspection on personnel and 
vehicles seeking to enter and depart ports. 
 
(b) The sinking of Korean naval vessel in March 2010 
 
Late at night on 28 March 2010, a Korean naval vessel sank suddenly. It was later 
verified scientifically by an international fact-finding team made up of the US, Sweden 
and other countries that North Korea had attacked the vessel with a torpedo (BBC, 2010; 
Euronews, 2010). The Korean government ordered the shipping industry and every port 
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authority to reinforce security measures to the extent equivalent to Security Level 2 
(quasi-Level 2) which became valid on 24 May 2010 to raise awareness of maritime 
border security and prevent security incidents.  
 
(c) Artillery attack by neighboring country on Korean territory in November 2010 
 
The most unprecedented direct attack on Korean territory since the Civil War truce 
required immediate security actions (McDonald, 2010). Since the Civil War truce, 
normally North Korea has provoked in a secret way and denied its involvement. 
However, this case was quite different from previous provocations. This was 
unmistakably artillery attacks on Korean maritime territory near the maritime border line 
between the two Koreas a few days after the successful hosting of the G20 Summit in 
November 2010. As a result, there were casualties of civilians as well as marines. In 
accordance with the Korean ISPS Code Act, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries 
collected the opinion of agencies concerned and promptly raised the Security Level from 
1 to 2 on designated ports and vessels calling those ports. 
 
4.5 Reduction of security incidents 
 
It is regrettable, but understandable that finding specific data resources in relation to 
security incidents at the national and international level was, as a matter of a fact, 
impossible unless authorities make it public because most countries, including Korea,                
classify such information as confidential. However, given the credibility of the official 
documents submitted to the IMO and some reports of trustworthy international 
organizations, it can be concluded that the Code has been conducive to reducing security 
incidents. 
 
(a) Republic of Korea  
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As a result of the application of security measures and activities on Korean-flagged 
vessels, unauthorized access has been reduced and prevented. In addition, security 
incidents related to smuggling and stowaways at the ship/port interface have also 
decreased dramatically (IMO, 2011b).  
 
(b) Islamic Republic of Iran  
 
Since implementation of the ISPS Code, Iran has not experienced any kind of security 
problems in its ports or territorial waters; thanks to well-organized precautionary 
measures adopted by related authorities. A noticeable reduction in the number and/or 
severity of security events occurring in the waters under the jurisdiction of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, or involving Iranian flagged vessels has been the most important and 
valuable outcome of the successful implementation of the ISPS Code (IMO, 2009). 
 
(c) Australia  
 
The Australian maritime security regime, which fully implements the requirements of 
SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, has been in place since 2003. Australia is fully 
compliant with the requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. There are 
no outstanding issues to be resolved in relation to the implementation of the provisions 
of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code (IMO, 2012a).  
 
(d) International Maritime Bureau reports 
 
In addition to the reports of Member States to the IMO, one noteworthy improvement 
has been in place in terms of attacks against ships at anchorage or alongside berth. The 
statistics compiled and published by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) show a 
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continued decline in the number of reported attacks during the past four years (Timlen, 
2007). According to the IMB survey and analysis, the number of attacks on vessels in 
the first half of 2012 decreased compared to the same period of last year; from 266 to 
177.  
 
The IMB determined that the decline of piracy activities was the result of preemptive 
and aggressive naval operations and reinforced security on board including hiring armed 
guards (IMB, 2012). Besides, the reduction in the frequency of persons able to stow 
away on ships is a positive result. This activity has not been eliminated, but there have 
been signs of improvement (Timlen, 2007). 
 
According to IMB annual reports from 2004 to 2012, the fluctuation of piracy and armed 
robbery incidents around the world is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 Piracy and armed robbery statistics from 2004 to 2012  
(Source : Edited by Author from the IMB annual reports from 2004 to 2012) 
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IMB annual reports analyze the statistics of piracy and armed robbery from various 
perspectives, including the status of ships during attack; berthed, anchored and steaming. 
While the status of steaming is the situation in which vessels are in navigation, for 
example, off the coast of Somalia or in and around the Gulf of Aden, the status of being 
berthed and anchored can be considered as the static situation in which vessels are under 
direct application of the ISPS Code in and around the port facility.  
 
Piracy during navigation can take place regardless of how much the vessel is well 
prepared in terms of ship security. Therefore, statistics in respect of the status of the 
vessel, being berthed or anchored, during attack can represent the effectiveness of the 
ISPS Code. In the absence of available information in respect of fluctuation of security 
incidents in a particular country where such sensitive information is not published, an 
analysis of statistics on attacks on ships at berth or anchor can be used to verify the 
effectiveness of the ISPS Code.  
 
 
Figure 5 Status of ships during attacks in 2012  
(Source : Edited by Author from the IMB annual report 2012) 
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In addition, the percentage of attacks while berthed or anchored over the total number of 
attacks on vessels can show how useful the ISPS Code is for preventing security 
incidents in and around port facilities and onboard vessels. The author searched the 
annual reports of the IMB from 2004, the year of entry into force of the ISPS Code, to 
2012 and extracted the following data; percentage of the number of attacks on vessels 
while berthed or anchored over the whole number of attacks each year. 
 
Percentages shown in Figure 6 indicate that the number of attacks while berthed and 
anchored has decreased on the whole with the exception of 2012 in which the number of 
piracy dropped dramatically owing to worldwide efforts to tackle piracy and armed 
robbery. So, the percentage in 2012 is just an outlier and can be dismissed. 
 
 
Figure 6 The percentage of attacks during being berthed and anchored over the whole 
attacks (Source : Edited by Author from the IMB annual reports from 2004 to 2012)  
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The ISPS Code has been effective in Korea in terms of building capacity and 
infrastructure of maritime security, enhancement of security awareness and raising 
Security Level. Such effectiveness was verified through international recognition from 
the IMO, USCG and APEC. Moreover, the reduction of security incidents was also 
contribution of the ISPS Code but it was hard to find real date other than the official 
report of Korea to the IMO. Despite the lack of specific data regarding security incidents, 
the reports of Iran, Australia and the IMB show that the ISPS Code has contributed to 
the decrease of security incidents in the maritime field. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CHALLENGES OF THE ISPS CODE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The creation of the ISPS Code is a painful brainchild of the distinguished maritime 
experts given the circumstances; the intensity of desperation of the maritime world after 
9/11 and the short period of time due to the urgency to introduce a new regime to 
address the terrorism. However, it is also truly right there is no perfect regime; therefore, 
it will be highly meaningful to reflect on the shortcomings and challenges that have 
appeared in the process of the implementation of the ISPS Code, and reflect on those 
points in the process of sharpening existing IMO Instruments. 
 
5.2 Problems in case of raising Security Level 
 
5.2.1 Security measures in each Security Level 
 
Under the Korean ISPS Code Act and Ministerial Decree, several security measures in 
case of Security Level 3 have been regarded as unrealistic given the importance of the 
free flow of logistics and economic activities. Problematic measures in my opinion of 
the author are as follows: 
 
(a) Suspending the loading or unloading of cargo and ship’s stores; 
(b) Refusal to accept unaccompanied baggage on board the passenger ship; 
(c) Suspension of access to port facility;  
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(d) Suspension of movement of cargo and vehicles within port facility; 
(e) Suspension of port operation within port facility; 
(f) Suspension of handling of unaccompanied baggage within port facility; 
(g) Suspension of the delivery of ship’s stores within port facility. 
 
In fact, the original ISPS Code Part B adopted by the IMO shows the flexibility of 
implementation of security measures even under Security Level 3 as follows: 
 
(a) Restriction or suspension of handling of ship’s stores and unaccompanied baggage 
(b) Suspension of access to all, or part, of the port facility; 
(c) Suspension of pedestrian or vehicular movement within all, or part, of the port 
facility; 
(d) Suspension of port operation within all, or part, of the port facility; 
(e) Restriction or suspension of cargo movements or operations within all, or part, of the 
port facility or specific ships; 
(f) Restriction or suspension of handling of unaccompanied baggage; 
(g) Restriction or suspension of the delivery of ship’s stores within all, or part, of the 
port facility 
 
The ISPS Code Part B recommends specific gradually-intensifying security measures 
under Security Level 1 through 3 with flexibility of implementation, within all, or part, 
of the port facility. However, this flexibility was not fully reflected in the process of 
national legislation of the ISPS Code in the Republic of Korea. The strict 
implementation of security measures was legislated and has been a barrier to economic 
activities and the government fully realized this problem arising out of the discrepancy 
between the original ISPS Code and the Korea Act. 
 
Here some questions arise. Should there be restraint in raising the Security Level up to 
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3? Is it not enough to maintain Security Level 2 unless there is an imminent threat, given 
the importance of harmony between security and the economic activities of the private 
sector? Why has the Korean government been actively in favor of raising the Security 
Level to the highest stage? In respect of these questions, Section 5.2 will offer 
reasonable explanation. This chapter will further look into the discord between several 
security regimes in Korea in terms of stage of Security Level. 
 
5.2.2 An expedient heightening of Security Level 
 
As pointed out in Section 4.3.2.2, the Korean government sometimes reinforced security 
measures while maintaining the Security Level unchanged in accordance with the 
decision of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Committee (ISPS 
Committee), ordering the Designated Authority and shipping industry to take stronger 
security measures equivalent to those under the higher Security Level in the Port Facility 
Security Plan (PFSP) and Ship Security Plan (SSP).  
 
This policy resulted from consideration of the private sector needs because heightened 
Security Level requires reinforced security measures and, in the end, leads to the impact 
on access to vessels, movement of cargo and vehicles within port facilities and 
restriction on the handling of cargo, unaccompanied baggage and ship’s stores. In other 
words, the Korean government has tried to give due considerations to minimize the 
negative impact on the economic activities of the private sector while achieving the 
objectives of security measures.  
 
However, raising security measures equivalent to a higher Security Level, while 
officially leaving the Security Level unchanged, is legally groundless so many 
government officials involved have expressed concern that, strictly speaking, a 
legitimate organization (ISPS Committee) has made a literally expedient decision. This 
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measure was groundless in terms of legality because the Korean legislations did not 
stipulate an expedient raising of Security Level. Several instances of making expedient 
decisions on raising the Security Level risked causing disregard of the heightened 
Security Level from both the public and private sector even though this decision resulted 
from thoughtful consideration for economic activities. Essentially, these expedient 
decisions would be attributable to the lack of flexibility of the Korean ISPS Code Act as 
opposed to the original IMO ISPS Code, which is well-evidenced by Section 5.2.1. 
 
5.3 Discrepancy with other Korean security regimes 
 
The ISPS Code stipulates the three-stage Security Level as follows:  
 
(a) Level 1 : Normal, the level at which the ship or port facility normally operates; 
minimum appropriate protective security measures; 
 
(b) Level 2 : Heightened, the level applying for as long as there is a heighted risk of a 
security incident; additional protective security measures; 
 
(c) Level 3 : Exceptional, when there is the probable or imminent risk of a security 
incident; further specific protective security measures.  
 
One of the salient features of the newly-adopted maritime security regime of the IMO is 
the stages of security measures because pre-existent security measures such as the 
Aviation Security and Anti-terrorism mechanism of Korea are equally composed of five 
stage security levels which have more stages than the ISPS Code. 
 
The Security level of Aviation is regulated in the ‘Aviation Safety and Security Act’ and 
related low-level ‘National Civil Aviation Contingency Plan’. This contingency plan is 
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made based on Article 31 of the Aviation Safety and Security Act’ (MOLEG, 2009). 
The Korean Aviation Security Level is made of five stages using color; Green (Normal, 
1) – Blue (Observation, 2) – Yellow (Advisory, 3) – Orange (Vigilant, 4) – Red (Serious, 
5). Just as the Maritime Security Level was elevated to Level 3 in preparation for the  
Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, the Aviation Security Level was also raised to the 
highest level at that time (South Korea to heighten airport security, 2012). 
 
Additionally, the anti-terrorism regime is also more closely related to the aviation sector 
rather than the maritime field due to the ramifications of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This 
regime is also composed of five stages in accordance with Article 35 and Article 36 of 
the ‘Presidential Decree on National Anti-terrorism Activities’; Normal – Observation – 
Advisory – Vigilant – Red (MOLEG, 2013a). In fact, the Aviation and Anti-terrorism 
regimes are identical to each other in terms of Security Level. 
 
The discrepancy between the ISPS Code and existing security regimes in Korea caused 
confusion from the beginning but the Korean government had no choice but to follow 
the system of the ISPS Code. To address this problem, the Korean government created a 
‘Table’ indicating as clearly as possible the stage in accordance with the development of 
an urgent situation. For example, Security Level 2 of the ISPS Code corresponds with 
Level 3 and 4 of the Aviation and Anti-terrorism regimes.  
 
  
Table 4 Comparison of security level between security regimes in Korea. 
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(Source : Edited by Author government officials concerned) 
 
However, there still exists confusion and difference of intensity of security measures 
between security regimes. For example, Level 3 of the ISPS Code must suspend every 
movement of cargo and vehicle within a port facility, and handling of unaccompanied 
baggage and ship’s stores whereas the highest Security Level of Aviation does not 
suspend the flow of logistics within an airport. Therefore, the maritime field has been 
inevitably more reluctant about raising the Security Level to the highest than the aviation 
field.  
 
In reality, international trade overwhelmingly depends on the maritime world and a 
small portion of trade is dependent on the aviation industry, which is predominantly 
focused on the movement of passengers. Fundamentally, there is a significant gap 
between the ISPS Code and other security regimes when it comes to harmony between 
security and economic activities. In other words, the maritime security regime must 
think about the ramifications of raising the Security Level, in terms of economic impacts, 
much more than other security regimes.  
 
5.4 Narrow focus on ships and ports facility 
 
Security measures covered by the ISPS Code are limited to matters involving the 
ship/port interface (McNaught, 2005). The Preamble of the ISPS Code also states that 
the provisions relating to port facilities should relate solely to the ship/port interface; 
therefore, the wider issue of the security of port areas will be the subject of further joint 
work between the IMO and the International Labour Organization (ILO) (IMO, 2012c). 
In a sense, the ISPS Code suffers from ‘built-in’ limitations that undermine its ultimate 
effectiveness (Cox, 2013) 
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Narrow focal points of the ISPS Code ignore major issues such as container security and 
vulnerability of the supply chain to tampering by criminals including terrorists 
(McNaught, 2005) As a matter of fact, inspection of the contents of containers falls 
outside the scope of the Code. As a result, contrary to the improvement in the number of 
security incidents such as attacks on ships and stowaway, smuggling of drugs has not 
been reduced because drugs are usually hidden inside containers. Concealments made 
within cargo and containers would involve activities taking place outside the scope of 
the ISPS Code (Timlen, 2007). 
 
In this context, the ISPS Code is unlikely to adequately mitigate the risk posed by 
containerized cargo as it cannot prevent or effectively detect terrorist threats. For 
example, the placement of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) within a shipping 
container is likely to be installed during another phase of the supply chain. This concern 
is expressly appearing in Korea and over time pan-governmental efforts in respect of 
supply chain security encompassing the application of the ISPS Code have been 
discussed. 
 
The US also stressed the shortcoming of the ISPS Code when it comes to handling of 
cargo (IMO, 2007); the ISPS Code focuses on the physical security of the port facility 
and vessel. There are some basic container security measures within the ISPS Code and 
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL), but a tenet of the 
design of the ISPS Code is that a secure facility and secure vessel will by default 
maintain the integrity of a container within these segments of the supply chain. In this 
sense, it is appropriate to consider methods to enhance security measures that are already 
contained within the ISPS Code, to include safeguards for maintaining the integrity of 
containers while within the port facility’s or vessel’s control.  
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5.5 Lack of the IMO enforceability 
 
5.5.1 The IMO Member States audit scheme 
 
In 2005, the IMO introduced audit scheme on Contracting Governments in respect of the 
application and implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments as the IMO realized that 
unceasing maritime accidents came from the inadequate and improper implementation 
of IMO instruments from the side of Contracting Governments. The introduction of the 
audit scheme on Contracting Governments was itself a groundbreaking commencement, 
but it is also true that the IMO can only monitor Contracting Governments’ compliance 
with the IMO mandatory Instrument when the Contracting Government agrees to receive 
an IMO audit on a voluntary basis. In fact, the enforcement of IMO Instruments is the 
domain of Contracting Governments, which have authority to carry out Port State 
Control (PSC) on foreign vessels and Flag State Administration on national vessels and 
port facilities.  
 
At the present moment, the audit scheme of the IMO is carried out on a voluntary basis 
even though it is supposed to be transformed into a mandatory regime in the future. The 
current audit scheme called VIMSAS (Voluntary IMO Member States Audit Scheme) 
has been carried out voluntarily and, furthermore, there are no sanctions on Contracting 
Governments if their implementation of the IMO instruments is found inappropriate. 
Given the fact that the IMO VIMSAS benchmarked the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) mandatory audit scheme which has impacted the aviation world 
around the world and contributed to upgrade the level of compliance with mandatory 
ICAO Instruments (IMO, 2004a; IMO 2005c), the current VIMSAS has clear limitation 
in enhancing the level of compliance with IMO Instruments.  
 
As an active participant in the international maritime world, Korea received an IMO 
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audit in April 2007. The IMO audit team determined that Korea was faithfully 
implementing IMO instruments. Korea took every possible action ranging from national 
legislation to rectification of problems evidenced by self-assessment prior to this audit 
(Lee, 2007). Even though Korea achieved numerous positive results by means of 
receiving the IMO audit voluntarily, not every Contracting Government of the IMO has 
the same perspective and standpoint on the audit scheme. Up to now there has not been 
sufficient cooperation of Contracting Governments with the IMO efforts to encourage 
VIMSAS and a total of 69 Contracting Governments and two Associate Members 
received IMO audits as of 3 June 2013 (IMO, 2013d).  
 
In addition, the fact itself that one country received an IMO audit does not guarantee 
high-level of compliance with IMO Instruments because it is impossible to gain detailed 
and named information with regard to the result of an audit under the current system. 
Without the consent of the Contracting Government, the IMO cannot make the result 
public. The report of the IMO audit is classified into three stages; interim, final and 
summary report. Interim and final reports are handled confidentially and available only 
to audited states, audit team and Secretary-General (IMO, 2005d). The periodical 
summary report which encompasses several audit reports drawn up by the Secretariat 
can be circulated for the information to all member states after consultation with states 
involved; however, it is still limited to enhance the implementation of the IMO 
Instruments. 
 
In fact, ratification of international conventions adopted by the IMO including national 
legislation is one thing and strict compliance with the ISPS Code is another, which is 
well evidenced in Nigeria whose ISPS Code was proved unfeasible through the ISP 
program of USCG (Oritse, 2013a). This result was, to a large extent, forecast in the 
previously-done research; Nigeria has implemented the ISPS Code but it has been found 
that the agency in charge of the Code has been remiss in providing clear guidelines and 
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directives, for example, on the Recognized Security Organizations (RSOs) (Okoroji, et 
al., 2011). In addition, it has been observed that most vessels have not complied with the 
Code due mainly to financial constraints. Therefore, it is recommended that Nigeria 
should adopt a pragmatic approach to the Code’s implementation, by complementing 
security gadgets with human resource training and development within the maritime 
industry.  
 
Unfortunately, it looks like that the situation in Nigeria has not been improved despite 
the research and efforts taken by the stakeholder. Pursuant to the Maritime Transport 
Security Act of 2002, the USCG assessed the compliance of Nigerian port facilities with 
the ISPS Code in May this year but it has turned out that Nigeria does not have accurate 
reports on the number of port facilities that currently exit in the country. The USCG 
noted that Nigeria as a contracting government to the convention does not know the total 
number of facilities where the Code applies. Even though there has been an increase in 
the number of attacks on vessels in and around Nigeria’s territorial waters, Nigeria is 
currently operating at only Security Level one in most of the facilities across the nation 
(Oritse, 2013b). As a result, the US gave an ultimatum, 90 days, to Nigeria before 
revisiting scheduled in late August. It seems that there has been a positive change in 
Nigeria during the 90 days (Iwori, 2013).  
 
5.5.2 Limitations of Port State Control regime 
 
Port State Control (PSC) is the implementation of the rights of the Port State over 
foreign vessels’ compliance with international mandatory conventions, mostly adopted 
by the IMO. In the absence of the IMO mandatory Contracting Governments audit 
scheme, PSC has been playing a significant role in enhancing the compliance of vessels 
with IMO mandatory instruments. Around the world, there exist nine PSC regimes such 
as Tokyo MOU, Paris MOU and USCG. In addition, each regime inspects foreign 
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vessels based on its own criteria and publishes annual reports.  
 
 
Table 5 PSC regimes worldwide (Source : FSI 19/6/2 2010) 
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Despite these functions of PSC, it is also true that PSC has focused on safety and 
environmental elements rather than security. Of course, the ISPS Code is just one 
chapter of SOLAS and PSC inspection is done with regard to a wide range of IMO 
mandatory instruments. Therefore, it is not uncommon that PSC officers have been 
primarily committed to inspecting whether the vessel concerned has complied with the 
IMO instruments regarding safety and protection of environment. The number of 
inspections on compliance with the ISPS Code is not enough to strengthen security on 
board a vessel and the reports of inspection have not sufficiently reflected security 
matters. Amid this situation, it is quite noteworthy for the USCG to publish an annual 
report on PSC inspections which encompass deficiencies regarding security issues as 
well as normal PSC inspections. 
 
 
 Figure 7 Deficiencies by Category (Source : Tokyo MoU 2012 Report) 
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Figure 8 Types of Safety Deficiencies (Source : USCG 2011 Report on PSC) 
 
 
Figure 9 Security Deficiencies by Category (Source : USCG 2011 Report on PSC) 
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In addition, inconsistency and lack of uniformity is another problem for PSC inspection. 
Currently, there is no unified international convention to regulate PSC affairs worldwide. 
Subsequently, the independent implementation of PSC inspection under the discretion of 
each PSC regime is functioning as a negative factor for the effective and efficient 
implementation of IMO instruments including the ISPS Code despite the new efforts 
such as the Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC), spearheaded by the Paris MOU 
and Tokyo MOU. 
 
5.6 Lack of response system to incidents 
 
The aftermath of security incidents is not mentioned in the ISPS Code and the Preamble 
states that the provisions in this Code should not extend to the actual response to attacks 
or to any necessary clear-up activities after such an attack (IMO, 2012c). This aspect is 
another built-in limitation of the ISPS Code according to Cox (2013). Therefore, the 
Code is preventative in nature and does not address the issue of response to attacks or 
remediation issues following an attack (IMO, 2005b). It is important to note that the 
ISPS Code primarily addresses how terrorist attacks can be deterred and minimized 
whereas detailed procedures in addressing the aftermath of a significant security incident 
are not mentioned (Ng, 2009).  
 
Given the preventive characteristics of the ISPS Code as pointed out by several 
researchers in the above paragraph, the Korean government included a contingency plan 
to address real attacks or security incidents in the National Port Security Program 
(NPSP) and Regional Port Security Program (RPSP) from the moment when those 
programs were drawn up in 2008. However, domestic legislation in respect of the ISPS 
Code can be different nation by nation. In essence, preparedness and response are 
closely related to each other so in the mid and long term it is necessary to find ways to 
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solve the lack of response systems to security incidents.  
 
5.7 Existence of variation among Member States 
 
Each Contracting Government is responsible for determining and enforcing appropriate 
security measures for its ships and ports, which are bound to be significantly different 
between nations in the standards of these measures (McNaught, 2005). Some 
Contracting Governments, especially Flag of Convenience (FOC) registries, have been 
identified as either corrupt, therefore vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists groups 
(Botelho, 2004) or lacking the resources or expertise to enforce acceptable standards 
(Raymond, 2005). In addition, Recognized Security Organizations (RSOs) expertise in 
the maritime field varies significantly (Heathcote, 2004). 
 
Given the limitations of enforceability of IMO instruments on account of the voluntary 
audit scheme on Contracting Governments, it has been reasonably anticipated that a 
great deal of discretion has been given to each Contracting Government and, inevitably, 
there has been inconsistency and unannounced non-conformity with the ISPS Code. In 
particular, the recommendatory Part B of the ISPS Code is one of sources of variations 
worldwide. As an example, as written in Section 5.1, the Korean government enacted the 
strict security measures under Security Level 3, which are apparently different from the 
paragraphs of Part B including to some extent flexibility of implementation of security 
measures. 
 
Among variations, lack of standardization at port facilities was more serious than ships. 
The implementation of the Code on board ships went smoothly, whereas effective 
implementation in port facilities in different countries varies significantly. These 
difficulties are mostly caused by limited economic potential, differing positions on the 
status of national and international maritime security systems, and finally, different 
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understandings of what mitigation measures should be accepted as appropriate in 
different countries (Zec, et al. 2009). 
 
5.8 Existence of vessels falling outside the scope of the ISPS Code 
 
Applicability of the ISPS Code to vessel types is also a weakness when it comes to 
addressing the terrorism threat. The ISPS Code does not apply to many kinds of vessels 
that are vulnerable to, or capable of, terrorist attack or exploitation. These include 
fishing vessels, high speed container vessels built prior to July 2001, vessels not engaged 
in international voyages and cargo ships less than 500 tonnage (McNaught, 2005).  
 
Part B of the ISPS Code (Paragraph 4.20) advises that Contracting Governments should 
consider establishing appropriate security measures to enhance the security of ships to 
which the SOLAS XI-2 and Part A of this Code do not apply and ensure that any 
security provisions applying to such ships allow interaction with ships to which Part A 
of the Code applies; however, Part B is not mandatory and unlikely to result in practical 
actions by Contracting Governments.  
 
Yachts and marinas are not covered by the Code due to the fact that yachts are in most 
cases less than 500 tonnage and marinas cannot accommodate ISPS vessels ( Zec, et al., 
2009). Small vessels and ports pose threats to security as they are essentially outside the 
scope of the ISPS Code and even when there is no domestic legislation and law 
enforcement function. Up to now, the IMO also presented non-mandatory guidelines to 
address threats arising out of non-SOLAS vessels (IMO, 2008c) 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters of this paper look into the effectiveness and challenges of the 
ISPS Code, which have been evidenced primarily in Korea. Based on the experiences of 
Korea, this chapter recommends feasible measures which can be taken at the national 
and international level for the purpose of better implementation and enhancement of 
international maritime security regime. 
 
6.2 Sophisticated legislation at the national and international level 
 
6.2.1 International standard legal framework 
 
It is fully understandable that the ISPS Code did not became wholly mandatory, given 
the short period of time from draft to entry into force. However, due in part to the 
recommendatory Part B of the ISPS Code and standpoint of the IMO to provide, to some 
extent, flexibility in the process of national legislation, there exist variations among 
national legislations enacted by Contracting Governments to the ISPS Code. As pointed 
out in chapter 5.1, the Korean ISPS Code Act was not enacted with the same extent of 
flexibility of security measures as the original ISPS Code part B. This could be 
attributed to the absence of adequate guidelines regarding national legislation or model 
legislation.  
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In this context, the MSC, at its eighty-second session agreed to the development of the 
model legislation on maritime security and subsequently 29 Member States and the 
European Commission suggested the minimum contents of model legislation on 
maritime security (IMO, 2008b). This movement is quite meaningful but there is a long 
way to the introduction because work on a draft is still on-going (IMO, 2013g). 
Meanwhile, the action to introduce a maritime security manual for the facilitation of the 
implementation of the ISPS Code and narrow the gap between Member States was 
highly commendable (IMO, 2011a).    
 
In fact, developing a code that is internationally comprehensible is a challenge. However,  
such a model must be concise and straightforward enough to be widely accessible (Cox, 
2013). In the process of development of model legislation, there are some points that 
need to be considered sufficiently to reduce the variations derived from the 
recommendatory Part B, and to address built-in limitations stipulated in the Preamble 
paragraph 5 of the ISPS Code, which states “It was further agreed that the provisions 
relating to port facilities should be related solely to the ship/port interface. It was also 
agreed that the provisions should not extend to the actual response to attacks or to any 
necessary clear-up activities after such an attack.” (IMO, 2012c).  
 
For the most Member States, the international mandatory convention can be a strong 
driving force for them to introduce and implement corresponding domestic legislation. 
Loosely-made international convention could trigger confusion and poor performance at 
the national level and give room for non-conformity. Therefore, the sophisticated 
international legislations in respect of maritime security, which can narrow the gap 
between the ISPS Code and national legislations of Member States, are necessary. 
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6.2.2 Sophisticated legislation at the national level 
 
The existence of globally-acceptable good model legislation on maritime security does 
not guarantee the desirable national legislation so there is need for Member States to 
make utmost efforts to enact or amend national legislations in a sophisticated manner, 
even prior to the introduction of model legislation.  
 
The Korean government has a precious experience with its own legislation. In 
accordance with the Korean Act, strict suspension of handling of cargo and ship’s stores 
and banning movement of cargo and vehicles within port facility was regulated without 
any flexible conditions. This strict legislation has raised concerns regarding the flow of 
goods in and around the facilities and further overall supply chain.  
 
In order to address this problem, Korea amended existent legislation to endow flexibility 
on maritime security measures in June 2013. This amendment added “Minister of 
Oceans and Fisheries can temporarily rule out the application of specific security 
measures which must be taken under certain Security Level, or make use of security 
measures in other Security Level if this action is recognized in order to prevent security 
incident in port facilities or ocean-going vessels or address security threats. In this case, 
Minister of Oceans and Fisheries must immediately notify the owners of port facilities or 
vessels of governmental decision” (MOLEG, 2013b).  
 
Ultimately, it is truly up to each Member State to enact national legislation in a 
reasonable way based on the international conventions, rules and regulations. The 
Korean experience to amend national legislation in respect of the ISPS Code, based on 
the real lessons acquired from the process of raising the Security Level, is noteworthy 
for other Member States. This move was taken to remove unreasonableness of 
legislation giving negative impact on the economic activities of the private sector, and to 
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harmonize security and smooth flow of cargo.     
 
6.3 Coordination among security regimes 
 
Addressing the confusion arising out of the discrepancy of Security Levels between 
national security regimes such as the ISPS Code, Anti-terrorism and Aviation security is 
another tough, yet subtle issue in Korea. Even though Korea is dealing with the 
discrepancy of Security Level among security regimes using a ‘Coordination Table’ as 
well as repeated training and drills, it is difficult to eliminate the root cause of confusion 
and lack of distinction.  
 
Given the urgency of security measures, a fewer-stage Security Level (three-stage of the 
ISPS Code) is more desirable and adequate in tackling the situation than multi-layered 
Security Levels (five-stage of Anti-terrorism and Aviation). In fact, the US government 
reduced the Security Level of Anti-terrorism from ‘color-base five stage’ to ‘two stage’ 
in order to enhance the capacity of response to emergency situations in 2011 (DHS, 
2011). In addition, Russia also introduced a three-level Anti-terrorism system to 
promptly inform people about the emergency of a terrorism threat and to organize 
activities to counter its realization (Russia introduces, 2012).  
  
In this context, the Korean government and other Member States need to abbreviate 
Security Levels of non-maritime security regimes. Around 70 countries use color-coded 
terror alert systems and levels vary from three to five (Russia to adopt, 2010). 
Considering the essential purport of a security regime, it is reasonable to reduce the 
number of stages of security level and enhance the feasibility and speed of security 
measures to imminent or expected threats. 
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6.4 Reinforcement of supply chain security 
 
According to McNaught (2005), the ISPS Code like many other IMO Instruments must 
be viewed not as a stand-alone solution to the maritime security threat, but rather as one 
component of a system in the fight against terrorism. However, the ISPS Code may 
seem stand-alone due to built-in limitations (Cox, 2013). To address the narrow scope of 
the ISPS Code implementation, there is a strong need for collaboration between 
organizations at the international as well as national level, and for supplementary 
measures in the name of global supply chain security.  
 
In this sense, in July 2013 there was a meaningful meeting in respect of cooperation 
between security regimes. Heads of the IMO, ICAO (International Civil Aviation 
Organization) and WCO (World Customs Organization) met in the IMO headquarters in 
London to strengthen supply chain security through close cooperation between the three 
organizations (IMO, 2013e). They stressed the importance of collaboration in order to 
enhance overall security in the process of movement of goods by sea, air and other 
modes. When it comes to global supply chain security, the IMO has the ISPS Code, the 
ICAO has Aviation Security regime and the WCO has the Advanced Economic Operator 
(AEO). Along with the international dimension, they urged Member States to cooperate 
closely with agencies mandated for security at the national level. 
 
In addition to the cooperation and collaboration between organizations concerned when 
it comes to security, it is also necessary to implement a series of supply regimes closely 
related to the supply chain; Advanced Economic Operator (AEO), Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), Megaports Initiative (MI) and so on. These regimes are for detecting 
forbidden items such as WMDs and radioactive materials inside the cargo. Detecting 
items, posing threats to security, hidden inside the cargo or container is not implemented 
by the ISPS Code.   
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(a) Advanced Economic Operator (AEO) 
 
The World Customs Organization (WCO) has decided to introduce a new logistics 
security system and regulations for trade security, security of international trade flow 
from producers to ultimate consumers, or Supply Chain Security based on the 
experiences from the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In order to complement global security 
regimes in the maritime and aviation fields, the WCO established the Framework of 
Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, which is the WCO SAFE Framework, 
in June 2005 (KCS, 2013).  
 
The core concept of this international Framework is the AEO program. AEO means “a 
party involved in the international movement of goods in whatever function that has 
been approved by or on behalf of a national Customs Administration as complying with 
WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards. AEOs include inter alia 
manufacturers, importers, exporters, brokers, carriers, consolidators, intermediaries, 
ports, airports, terminal operators, integrated operators, warehouses, distributors” 
(Polner, 2010).  
 
Even though the AEO program is not a mechanism to inspect cargo or containers, the 
benefit of this system differentiate the verified operators and non-verified ones in the 
field. Therefore, it is conducive to focus resources and personnel into non-verified cargo 
and containers and eventually the security of the supply chain.  
 
(b) Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
 
In January 2002, the US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) created the Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. CSI places CBP 
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officers at select foreign seaports to work with host-country customs officials to identify 
and scan high-risk cargo before it is shipped to the United States. When it comes to the 
timing of introduction, CSI is the first one among a variety of security-related regimes 
created following the 9/11 tragedy.  
The three core elements of CSI are to identify high-risk containers, to prescreen and 
evaluate containers before they are shipped and, lastly, to use technology to prescreen 
high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be done rapidly without slowing down 
the movement of trade. CSI is now operational at ports in North America, Europe, Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East, and Latin and Central America. CBP’s 58 operational CSI ports 
now prescreen over 80 percent of all maritime containerized cargo imported into the 
United States (CBP, 2013). 
 
(c) Megaports Initiative (MI) 
 
This regime, led by the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), detects 
nuclear and other radioactive materials that might be hidden inside containers or cargo. 
The MI helps partner countries equip major international seaports with radiation 
detection equipment and alarm communication systems. In addition, the Megaports 
Initiative provides comprehensive training for foreign personnel, short-term maintenance 
coverage, and technical support to ensure the long-term sustainability and viability of 
installed radiation detection systems. 
 
The goal of the Megaports Initiative is to scan as much container traffic as possible 
(including imports, exports, and transshipped containers) regardless of destination and 
with minimal impact to port operations. The Megaports Initiative seeks to equip 100 
seaports around the world with radiation detection systems by 2015, scanning 
approximately 50 percent of global maritime containerized cargo. Since the start of the 
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Megaports Initiative in fiscal year 2003, NNSA has completed installations at 27 ports 
around the world to date (NNSA, 2013). 
 
In fact, the US has preemptively introduced a number of initiatives to further address the 
security of cargo, in particular, containers outside the scope of the ISPS Code. The CSI 
and MI were launched by the US and there are more regimes in place by the US 
government. The Korean government actively cooperated with international regimes 
such as the AEO launched by the WCO and the US-led security regimes such as CSI and 
MI. Korea concluded that the ISPS Code alone is not enough to guarantee security in the 
process of the supply chain. The maritime world needs to bear in mind that a stand-alone 
regime has limitations in terms of effectiveness and actively join the global movement 
for the enhancement of supply chain security.   
 
6.5 Buildup of the ISPS Code enforceability 
 
6.5.1 The revision of the IMO Member State audit scheme 
 
The inception of Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme (VIMSAS) has motivated 
the IMO Member States and maritime world to comply with IMO instruments and 
eventually to mitigate the occurrence of maritime accidents and environmental damage. 
Despite these positive aspects, it is also true that the VIMSAS has inherent limitations in 
terms of the possibility of Member States' non-cooperation, and lack of feasibility and 
effectiveness derived from its voluntariness. This is well evidenced in the number of 
States accepting IMO audits (IMO, 2013d). To achieve the intrinsic objectives of the 
audit system, it is necessary to look into the limitations of the current scheme, and look 
for the ways to improve the VIMSAS.  
 
The Korean Government received an IMO audit successfully on a voluntary basis in 
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April 2007. As a result, the Korean Government has been benefitted a lot from 
implementation of the IMO audit because Korea took this opportunity to re-evaluate the 
state of implementation of the IMO mandatory instruments. In the process of preparing 
for the audit, Korea took necessary actions ranging from enactment of relevant Acts and 
lower-level legislations such as Presidential and Ministerial Decrees. However, every 
Contracting Government is not like the case of Korea because of the diversity of social 
and financial situations each Contracting Government faces. Therefore, there are definite 
limitations to VIMSAS in terms of enforceability of the IMO Instruments. 
 
Given the clear distinction of the Member State audit scheme between the IMO and 
ICAO, the IMO must also pave the way for the mandatory audit regime and the 
maritime world must prepare for the implementation of a mandatory audit scheme 
appropriately in the coming years. With regard to the change of the audit scheme, the 
Secretary-general of the IMO, Mr. Koji Sekimizu, also emphasized the importance of 
the mandatory audit scheme (IMO, 2012d) and the IMO is also trying to transform the 
current voluntary regime to mandatory one by 2016 (IMO, 2013c). Consequently, every 
Member State needs to keep a close eye on the development of the audit scheme and be 
prepared for drastic changes in the foreseeable future. 
 
6.5.2 Effective implementation of port state control 
    
Current Port State Control (PSC) is predominantly carried out on arriving vessels. It 
means that PSC does not explicitly focus on the control of vessel departures. However, it 
is technically more difficult to enforce law at sea than on land. In addition, a vessel 
moves globally and may therefore travel to States that do not participate in any PSC 
regime. Just as the departing port control is strictly implemented in the field of aviation, 
regulated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), PSC regimes could 
integrate additional rules that help to establish an equivalent system (IMO, 2012b). 
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In addition to the new approach mentioned above, information sharing and cooperation 
among a number of PSC regimes is significant. Current PSC activities are carried out on 
an independent basis by 9 regimes around the world; the USCG, Paris MoU, Tokyo MoU 
and so on. Thus, the IMO needs to standardize the methodology of PSC and reinforce 
the cooperation and coordination between PSC regimes (IMO, 2012b).  Through 
benchmarking the strongly-enforced PSC system of the USCG, and institutionalization 
of new methods to enhance the effectiveness of the PSC such as Concentrated Inspection 
Campaign (CIC) and New Inspection Regime (NIR) which are initiated by the Paris 
MoU, the enforceability of the IMO Instruments can be improved (Paris MoU, 2009; 
Paris MoU, 2012).   
 
6.5.3 IMO technical cooperation program  
 
IMO proactively encouraged Contracting Governments to implement the ISPS Code 
effectively and appropriately from the beginning of its entry into force of the ISPS Code 
by means of technical cooperation programs such as workshops and training courses 
(IMO, 2013a; IMO, 2013b). In addition, the MSC introduced a guidance on basic 
elements of a national oversight program for SOLAS XI-2 and the ISPS Code, and 
helped Member States to carry out self-assessment effectively. 
 
In addition, regional cooperation programs have been conducive to the implementation 
of the ISPS Code under the auspices of the IMO. As an example, the fourth regional 
seminar on Latin American maritime legislation took place in Colombia in March 2006 
in the presence of 37 delegations throughout South America. During this seminar, 
participants discussed how to implement IMO instruments effectively and suggested 
some recommendations for the ISPS Code, such as necessity of bi- or multilateral 
agreements on the exchange of information relating to security issues between 
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Contracting Governments, national legislation on responsibilities of the Recognized 
Security Organizations (RSOs), coercive actions for substandard port facilities and 
vessels, and applying the ISPS Code to non-SOLAS vessels internally (IMO, 2006a). 
 
Considering the credibility and expertise of the IMO, each Member State needs to make 
the best use of the IMO assistance programs, and actively take part in regional programs 
which are held independently of or in collaboration with the IMO or other international 
organization such as APEC. 
 
6.5.4 USCG IPS Program  
 
On behalf of the IMO, the USCG has been playing a vital role in enhancing the 
standards of port facilities around the world by means of its International Port Security 
(IPS) Program. The USCG is mandated by the US Maritime Transport Security Act 
(MTSA) to assess security arrangements at non-US ports. As a result of assessment of 
foreign ports, a Port Security Advisory (PSA) is published.  
 
The PSA clearly shows which port facilities are substandard, not complying with the 
ISPS Code and what kind of security measures will be imposed on vessels that call at 
substandard ports, bound for US ports. The PSAs list countries for which there are 
concerns regarding the ISPS Code compliance at all or some port facilities (Timlen, 
2007). PSAs require the country directly concerned and all nations around the world, 
specifically having the interest of trade with the US, to pay attention to the security issue 
and take appropriate actions in order for vessels bound for the US to be granted 
permission to enter the US ports. 
 
The most recent example of the effectiveness of the ISP program is the case of Nigeria 
in 2013. The Nigerian government has been desperately trying to enhance its security 
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system as a result of the USCG ISP program conducted in May 2013. The Nigerian 
Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) has begun the process of 
installing what it called black flags in Nigerian ports that are not complying with the 
ISPS Code and Nigerian and IMO flags in the ISPS Code-compliant ports. These are 
part of the measures the agency has put in place to ensure it meets the ultimatum given 
to the Nigerian government to boost security in its maritime domain by the USCG (Iwori, 
2013). 
 
In the absence of strong enforceability of IMO instruments, the IPS Program of the 
USCG has made a great deal of contributions to the soft-landing of the new maritime 
security regime, the ISPS Code, since its inception in 2004. Even though IPSP is carried 
out based on mutual agreement and as a form of visit to foreign port facilities, it has 
tremendous enforcement power because PSA publishes substandard port facilities and 
states, and the additional security measures necessary such as raising Security Level 
onboard the vessels and strict inspection by the USCG at the time of port calls to the US 
ports.  
 
As well-evidenced in Nigeria, the USCG has been playing a significant role in 
enhancing the IMO Contracting Governments’ compliance with the ISPS Code instead 
of the IMO. It can be effective in the short term but this practice is not desirable in the 
long term for the IMO as well as the US. For the US, which is always deeply concerned 
with threats from anti-American groups around the world, the involvement in other 
country’s administrations based on US domestic legislation, MTSA, can trigger backlash 
and ultimately attempted and real attacks on the US. The bottom line is to gain 
substantial enforceability of IMO Instruments by the IMO, not by other international or 
specific Contracting Governments. 
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6.6 Addressing the non-ISPS Code vessels 
 
National maritime security systems have to be introduced and amended by introducing 
measures appropriate for the particular circumstances (Zec, et al., 2009) if the unique 
security threats exist at the national level in case of non-application of the Code. In this 
context, it is necessary to address the security aspects of the operation of non-SOLAS 
ships in a systematic and analytical manner, so as to achieve a tangible enhancement of 
the global security net which the provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code 
seek to establish. As a typical instance, the US Department of Homeland Security 
introduced regulations to address small vessels not subject to the ISPS Code; Small 
Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) and Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan 
(SVS-IP) (IMO, 2011c). 
 
A number of Contracting Governments have implemented or intend to implement 
common safety principles and rules for carriage of Automatic Identification System  
(AIS) equipment for ships which are not included in the requirements of SOLAS chapter 
V. Similarly, Turkey also mandated the carriage of AIS on certain classes of 
non-SOLAS Turkish-flagged vessels by issuing a related Directive in 2007 (IMO, 
2008a). 
 
The IMO MSC, at its eighty-fifth session, approved the non-mandatory Guidelines on 
security aspects of the operation of vessels which do not fall within the scope of SOLAS 
chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code as guidance for Contracting Governments (IMO, 2008c). 
These guidelines have been formatted in two parts: Part 1 contains information of 
interest to Contracting Governments and other authorities with responsibilities for 
administering non-SOLAS vessels (commercial non-passenger, non-SOLAS passenger, 
fishing and pleasure vessels) and Part 2 contains information pertinent to the owners, 
operators and users of non-SOLAS vessels and related facilities (marinas, port and 
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harbor facilities) with appendices containing information specific to the four vessels 
categories and facilities.  
 
These guidelines were created from a series of efforts of Contracting Governments 
which proposed a number of documents to deal with security issues related to 
non-SOLAS vessels (IMO, 2006b; IMO, 2007) and, in particular, non-flagged vessels 
exploited for illegal immigration (IMO, 2010b). In terms of enhancing the level of 
security around the world, the guidelines of the IMO are not enough. Therefore, there is 
definitely strong need to introduce more powerful Instruments to mandate Member 
States to enact legislation and carry out security measures addressing non-SOLAS 
vessels.  
  
6.7 Buildup of response to incidents 
 
The ISPS Code is not a contingency plan for incidents, but contains preparatory 
measures for them. Unlike the expectations of the agencies concerned, there is always 
the possibility that security incidents happen. In this regard, the characteristic of 
preparedness of the Code must be consolidated with a response system to incidents at 
national and international levels. 
 
Contracting Governments need to include the response system and procedure to 
security-related incidents as complementary measures in the process of domestic 
legislation of the ISPS Code. Likewise, the IMO should also review the current ISPS 
Code and engage it with response systems and emergency plans with Contracting 
Governments to improve the effectiveness of its implementation.  
 
As a good example, the Korean government included a contingency plan to address real 
attacks or security incidents in the National and Regional Port Security Program from 
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the moment when those programs were drawn up in 2008. However, domestic 
legislation in respect of the ISPS Code can be different nation by nation. In essence, 
preparedness and response are closely related to each other, so in the mid and long term 
it is necessary to consolidate a response system into the existing ISPS Code through the 
amendment of the ISPS Code or guidelines or suggestions for Model Legislation. 
 
Looking into the effectiveness and challenges of the ISPS Code is meaningless unless 
reasonable recommendations are suggested to the whole maritime world. The primary 
objective of this paper is to provide recommendations to make the established ISPS 
Code more well-organized and effective. In order to make recommendations in this 
chapter come true, strong collaboration and coordination at the national and international 
level are required.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The IMO maritime security regime, the ISPS Code, was introduced in 2002 in the wake 
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and entered into force in 2004 to address terrorism. It has 
achieved substantial success in Korea: building capacity and infrastructure in respect of 
maritime security, raising security awareness, successful hosting of internationally 
important events, relevant and fast response to emergency situation, and reduction of 
security incidents.   
 
Prior to the introduction of the ISPS Code, there was no Act-level legislation to address 
security issues in Korea, only a Presidential Decree which applies only to the public 
sector. With the newly-enacted Act-level legislation passed by the National Assembly, 
now Korea has a robust system regarding maritime security. Act-level legislation can 
control the public and private sector as well by means of articles in respect of offenses 
and penalties, so law enforcement in the field of maritime security has become more 
effective compared to the pre-ISPS Code era. Furthermore, it heightened the security 
culture inside the public sector in respect of compliance with rules and regulations. In 
addition, Korea has raised the Security Level stipulated in the ISPS Code and these  
experiences can be utilized by the IMO as well as by other Contracting Governments 
when they set up plans to strengthen security. 
 
The beginning of this instrument was on the right track at the right time, but it is also 
true that it has left something to be desired based on Korean experiences, given the 
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speedy process of the introduction of the ISPS Code and insufficient expertise in Korea. 
One of the challenges of the ISPS Code, pointed out in the process of implementation, 
has derived from the unique characteristic of the ISPS Code, recommendatory Part B. In 
the process of adoption and entry into force, it was agreed to leave Part B 
non-mandatory unlike Part A in order to give some room to Contracting Governments. It 
resulted in, to some extent, variations among Contracting Governments. The Korean 
ISPS Code Act does not have flexibility for implementing security measures under 
Level 3 unlike the IMO ISPS Code Part B, which prompted the Korean government to 
think about how to harmonize the balance between security and facilitation of trade.  
 
In addition, the lack of IMO enforceability in the absence of a strong Member State 
audit scheme is another challenge the maritime world needs to address. Non-existence of 
a response system to incidents and narrow scope of applicability, ship/port interface, are 
significant points to be contemplated by the maritime world. Differences in security 
levels among different security regimes in Korea were also pointed out in this paper.   
 
In order to address challenges found through Korean experiences in the implementation 
of the ISPS Code, this paper presented recommendations: i) sophisticated legislation at 
the national and international level such as the introduction of model legislation, 2) 
coordination with other security regimes in terms of number of security levels, 3) 
reinforcement of supply chain security through collaboration with other regimes such as 
AEO, CSI and MI, 4) buildup of the ISPS Code enforceability by means of transition of 
the IMO Member State audit scheme, from voluntary to mandatory, and active 
participation by the US and international entities, 5) addressing the threats from 
non-SOLAS vessels, 6) buildup of response to security incidents. 
 
The most international conventions have evolved with numerous amendments reflecting 
the valuable experiences and lessons pointed out by the Contracting Governments. The 
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ISPS Code is not the exception. The fast-adopted ISPS Code has been significantly 
effective in addressing maritime security threats in Korea, but it has provided some 
challenges to be overcome. The maritime world can strengthen the enforceability and 
effectiveness of the ISPS Code through implementation of recommendations in this 
paper.  
 
Adoption of security regime at the IMO and ratification by Member States must not be 
regarded as the sufficient measures to obtain security. The most important thing is to 
maintain security with every possible means including non-ISPS Code regimes which 
are implemented nationally and internationally. Just ratification of the ISPS Code at the 
national level can be illusion and self-satisfaction which can be shattered in real 
situations. At a time when this relatively young regime marks the tenth year of 
implementation, it is quite meaningful to look back on the past ten years and prepare for 
another decade with endeavors to enhance the effectiveness of the ISPS Code 
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